Global politics in the twenty-first century is complicated by dense economic interdependence, rapid technological innovation, and fierce security competition. How should governments formulate grand strategy in this complex environment? Many strategists look to deterrence as the answer, but how much can we expect of deterrence? Classical deterrence theory developed in response to the nuclear threats of the Cold War, but strategists since have applied it to a variety of threats in the land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Revisiting Deterrence Theory—What Is Deterrence? -- Deterrence Is Not (Just) One Thing -- Politics by (Many) Other Means -- Cyberspace Is Unsuitable for the Strategy of War -- Cyberspace Is Ideal for the Strategy of Deception -- Cyber Deception versus Nuclear Deterrence -- Land : Presence and Credibility / with Koji Kagotani -- Sea : Maneuver and Uncertainty -- Air : Automation and Cost / with James Walsh -- Space : Intelligence and Stability / with Bryan Early -- Trade : Asymmetry and Multipolarity / with Oliver Westerwinter -- Cyber : Complements and Substitutes / with Nadiya Kostyuk -- Gray Zone: Ambiguity and Escalation / with J. Andrés Gannon and Peter Schram -- Summary and Implications